Little Hope for a Post-Election “Reset” in Turkey-EU Relations
Emine Ay (Dublin City University)
The presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey resulted in a double victory for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. While his party retained control of the parliament through alliances with ultra-nationalist and Islamic fundamentalist parties, he was re-elected for another term of five years, extending his rule into a third decade by narrowly beating his centre-left challenger Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.
The most important elections in the world this year, as many have called them, have been marked with many aspects that are unprecedented in Turkey’s political history. Not only did the country experience the first-ever run off presidential elections, but it also witnessed the largest opposition coalition of parties that seized the historical opportunity to unite their forces to defeat the autocratic strongman. With the highest voter turnout reaching a record of 88.9% and widespread citizen mobilisation to observe ballot boxes, this has been the most contested competition the country has ever witnessed.
However, as expected, the playing field was highly tilted in favour of the incumbent, Erdoğan, making the elections only partly free and extremely unfair. Erdoğan employed a cunning strategy to prevent his most powerful potential rival, Ekrem İmamoğlu, from running as the presidential candidate by leveraging the government-controlled judiciary against him. His tactic reflects his previous similar actions in 2015 when he targeted Selahattin Demirtaş, the leader of the pro-Kurdish party and his strongest challenger, in the face of losing the parliamentary majority.
Not only the top-level potential challengers but also political opponents from parliamentary and municipality levels were also banned from the political arena. Numerous Kurdish politicians and mayors still remail unjustly prisoned. On top of everything, citizen observers, who were called upon by the opposition bloc to protect the ballot boxes, faced threats from the Minister of Interior, who tried to mobilize the police and the soldiers to impede their efforts.
Furthermore, the elections were held under extremely unfair conditions. Erdoğan enjoyed the disproportionate share of media coverage by not only state-run TV channel but also by the mainstream media in general, 90% of which is under his control, while his presidential opponent Kılıçdaroğlu received very little airtime except from a handful of opposition channels. The allocation of the state resources and instrumentalization of the state bureaucracy for Erdoğan’s election campaigns, and his immunity from propaganda bans are some other indicators of the unfairness of the playing field for the opposition. The extensive support from the state institutions and a total control over the media and state resources created a daunting challenge for the opposition forces.
What does this victory mean?
While the electoral victory has boldened Erdoğan’s one-man rule into the third decade, it has also deepened divisions within the country, leaving progressive and secular sections feeling threatened, intimidated and devoid of hope for their future. For half of the country, the results are considered as the last nail in the coffin for democracy, as they proved that seemingly invincible dictators do not yield power through the ballot box alone. Also, Erdoğan’s coalition with two Islamic fundamentalist parties, which prioritize Islamic education and hold anti-LGBT and anti-feminist stances, is particularly threatening to women and the LGBT community. At the time of writing, imams were appointed to 1/3 of the schools in pilot cities İzmir and Eskişehir to do “spiritual counselling” and 238 schools were allocated to a pro-government religious foundation TÜGVA to deliver religious courses.
However, for many the election outcomes carry implications that fade the hopes of not only re-democratisation but also of reintegration with the West. With his pro-Western and proactive foreign policy agenda, Kılıçdaroğlu was signalling a reset in the relations with the West, particularly with the EU, based on trust and further engagement. He had made a strong foreign policy commitment to initiating the EU membership process in the immediate aftermath of the elections, and to ensure the implementation of all the necessary criteria. He promised to revisit the EU-Turkey migration deal, by seeking a more balanced distribution of responsibilities for accommodating refugees. Kılıçdaroğlu also vowed to secure visa-free access to the EU for Turkish citizens, instilling hope among his supporters for a brighter future.
Although Kılıçdaroğlu’s pledges to restore the democracy and the rule of law by reverting to the parliamentary system and by reintegration with the West energized the opposition around the “cause”, it is questionable whether the EU shared the same level of enthusiasm for a potential Kılıçdaroğlu victory. The anti-refugee policies prioritised in the party agenda, which marked Kılıçdaroğlu’s rhetoric, particularly after the first round of elections to attract the ultra-nationalist votes from the third candidate, clearly raised concern within the EU. On the other hand, a Kılıçdaroğlu victory would likely have eased the EU’s frustrations over Turkey’s block on Sweden’s NATO membership. Also, Kılıçdaroğlu was more likely to shift Turkey away from Moscow. However, one still can debate whether this would have sufficed to make Kılıçdaroğlu a favourable candidate for the EU, considering his persistence in not compromising about the migration deal with the EU. Anyway, the EU would have faced a genuine dilemma if Kılıçdaroğlu had won.
As many anticipated, remaining in power, Erdoğan is unlikely to change his policies in domestic politics or international affairs. In fact, he might even be more empowered and encouraged to go on with what he is doing: cracking down on dissent, drifting away from rule law at home and maintaining close ties with Russia, while at the same time maintaining his tense and transactional relations with the EU. It is yet to be seen whether he will moderate his stance regarding Sweden’s NATO membership.
While his one-time pro-EU approach initially provided the legitimacy that he needed to appeal to secular and pro-western Turkish citizens in his way to consolidate his power and entrench himself in the office, the restrained relations with the EU seems to be still benefiting Erdoğan in distinct ways. The the trump card on refugees that he has been playing effectively against the EU, also has worked well during his election campaigns. Erdoğan seized the opportunity to counter his rival’s anti-refugee stance by re-emphasizing that hosting the immigrants is a human rights obligation, highlighting their freedom to return to their home countries if they so desire. In doing so, he appealed not only to immigrant voters within Turkey but also to the international Muslim community, effectively playing the inclusion card and undermining his rival in the eyes of many. In this way, Erdoğan also signalled his commitment to transactional relations with the EU, positioning himself as a more favourable candidate for the EU’s interests.
At the time of writing, Erdoğan has adopted an aggressive tone in response to the recent surge in visa rejections faced by Turkish citizens. He has labelled it as a “political blackmail” by the EU and vowed to solve the issue as soon as possible. This is a clear indication that Erdoğan will adopt a more aggressive stance in his relations with the EU, while continuing to leverage the refugee issue as a trump card.
Emine Ay is a PhD student in the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University.
The views expressed in this blog reflect the position of the author and not necessarily that of the Brexit Institute Blog.